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What is the Ideal level of system architecture for safety?

The System Architecture is a key input document for the technical safety concept (TSC)/Requirements (TSRs). Interestingly, it is also a work product that gets refined by the TSC, often leading to defining new System elements and Interfaces to satisfy Safety requirements. However, several people do not understand why a System Architecture is needed to create the TSC! Shouldn’t it not be that the System Architecture implements the TSRs? Also, what is the right level of information required in a Safety System Architecture?  This article is an attempt to bridge this knowledge gap and support the creation of more ‘Safety friendly!!” System Architectures 😃 What is the purpose of a System Architecture with respect to Safety? To understand the purpose for System Architecture with respect to Safety, we first need to know the steps involved in doing a technical safety concept. Please refer the flowchart below. Figure 1: Steps involved in creating a TSR. To begin the technical safety concept, we

Screw the Audit

  One of the most common mistakes that we have seen developers make when working on a safety program is to think too much about the audit/assessment. We constantly get questioned about whether the things they are doing are sufficient for an audit or whether there would be Non-Compliances (NC) that could arise for doing things in a particular way. Unfortunately, this is a wrong thought process to have. The most important stakeholder for a safe product is the people who will be using the product or the people who could be affected by the safe product (Think pedestrians sharing the same road as the vehicle that is deemed safety relevant). As a developer the thought process should be about doing all the right things relating to safety. A non-exhaustive list of ‘Right Things’ are given below: Understanding what a safe product looks like and what it takes to develop it (Think technology, process, methods & tools) Transparently stating the limits and limitations of your product (Safety

Functional Safety for Domain Controller (DC) ECUs

With the advent of enticing user experience, Electrification and ADAS features in the car, vehicle architecture is strongly headed towards Domain Controllers. In this article, let us discuss the following aspects: What is a Domain controller? Why are OEMs going towards Domain Controllers? What considerations should we have for functional safety in Domain Controllers? In case multiple suppliers are involved in the development of the Domain controller, what challenges exist and how to handle them? What is a Domain controller? Why are OEMs going towards Domain Controllers? Traditional vehicle architectures are de-centralized and distributed with one ECU typically implementing 1 feature/function. Every time a new function/feature is added, a new ECU is added. This kind of an architecture is extremely complex and heavy in terms of wiring (lots of cables, contacts, fusing, relays etc) and makes it very expensive to package all the ECUs into a car. Also, with the increased focus on automated

SW SEooC Verification

If you are an SW SEooC developer, how do you know if you have sufficiently verified your SW? Our 2 -part videos will help you get an answer to this question. If you are new to SEooC, check out our earlier article .

Getting started in ADAS!

If you are someone who has been working in the Automotive domain in various ECUs like power train ECUs, Infotainment, Instrument clusters, Body control etc and you are now getting started in the world of ADAS (Advanced Driver Assistance Systems), this article is for you! ADAS is the way to go for automotive innovation in this decade and THE Safety solution for lesser car accidents on the road. We have compiled here some extremely good articles and videos that can help you get started in ADAS. Read, Watch them. Have fun learning!! SAE Driving levels: https://autonomous-driving.org/2018/03/20/the-6-levels-of-autonomous-driving/ Overview of ADAS:  https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/driver-assistance-technologies#driving-control-assistance-30676 https://dewesoft.com/daq/what-is-adas Complete course on Self-driving cars: https://www.ipb.uni-bonn.de/sdc-2021/ https://www.ipb.uni-bonn.de/sdc-2020/ ADAS Features: ACC: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=own_VaRZ9M8 Reverse Parking Collision Avoid Ass

Calibration Data

 

Configuration Data

 

Flow of Functional Safety Requirements

 

Frequently asked Questions from our Systems Webinar

We have posted some frequently asked questions that were asked during our Systems Webinar in the pdf attached here. Please click the link below to access it. Happy learning! Safety FAQs

Safety Highlights 6-11 of Adaptive Autosar

In our previous blog, we introduced you to the first 5 Safety highlights of Adaptive Autosar. In this blog, let us discuss the remaining 6 highlights. 6. Safe Service oriented Communication HAD use cases demand dynamic upgrade of software applications throughout the entire vehicle lifecycle and to subsequently add new software functions, for instance via over-the-air software updates. Applications may be developed and tested independent of each other in distributed working groups and then integrated into the overall system at any time. Using Service-oriented communication between the software applications makes this possible. Service-Oriented Communication (SoC) is the main communication pattern for AA Applications. The concept of service-oriented communication is based on the idea that there are applications that provide a service on the communication system and other applications subscribe to this service.  The data will only be sent to the subscribers. Here is a picture from Autosar

Safety Highlights 1-5 of Adaptive Autosar

In our previous blog , we introduced you to the 11 Safety highlights of Adaptive Autosar. In this blog, let us discuss the first 5 highlights. 1. Safety considerations for high performance oriented hardware While CA is targeted to run on Microcontrollers that offer hard real time performance, Adaptive AUTOSAR Platform is targeted to run on complex SOCs with hardware accelerators such as accelerators for advanced graphics processing, deep learning accelerators, DSPs, Multi-cores etc in order to achieve high performance. Obviously, this means that there is a lot of concurrent processing going on. To achieve deterministic execution for Safety functions, AA provides design guidelines for using parallel processing technologies .  An ASIL compliant Hypervisor must be used to partition and isolate the Safety critical aspects of the System from the non-Safety related System. 2. Support for Safe and Secure use of C++ While the CA supports only C language, AP support C++ since it is the language

11 Safety highlights in Adaptive AUTOSAR

  Adaptive AUTOSAR (AA) is the buzz word in the context of highly automated driving (HAD). It is the AUTOSAR consortium’s solution for high performance computing and flexible over-the-air updates in HAD and also other ECUs such as Domain Controllers, Infotainment systems etc.  While Classic AUTOSAR (CA) offers an excellent solution to handle traditional ECUs with deeply embedded software and hard real time requirements, it cannot handle HAD and other such intelligent ECUs because its design does not support the high performance and flexibility requirements of these ECUs. This sprung the need to develop a new platform for such ECUs and thus was born AA. An OEM or Tier-1 chooses AA so that they do not have to reinvent the wheel for an architectural solution for the Intelligent ECUs. Due to the safety criticality of these Intelligent ECUs, AA incorporates several safety aspects as part of its architecture. In this blog, we have highlighted 11 of the key differentiating aspects.  However,

Functional Safety Systems Webinar

This is a recording of our Functional Safety Systems Webinar that was conducted on 10-November-2021. Click on the image below to download the webinar slides

Functional Safety Systems - Part 4 - Webinar

This is a recording of our Functional Safety Systems Webinar that was conducted on 10-November-2021.

The inconclusive debate - Class II or Class III

ISO26262’s HW Evaluation talks about 3 Classes of HW Components – Class I, II or III. There are 3 attributes we must use to determine this Class. Once we identify the Class, we need to evaluate them accordingly. At a first glance, this approach sounds simple and straight forward. However, when we read deeper, we realize that the ISO Standard is ambiguous in describing how to determine HW Classes. While it does give 3 attributes, it does not mention how to correlate them. This makes it difficult to conclude how to classify some of the HW elements, especially the medium and high complexity HW ICs. In this blog, we have shared our 2 cents on HW classification of Class II and Class III elements. HW elements are classified based on 3 attributes: Complexity Ease of Identification of failure modes and  Availability of Safety mechanisms Based on these 3 attributes, Class of a HW element is identified as shown below. Can you see the gap in the above table? It does not define how to correlate th

ASIL Certification for HW Components and HW Evaluation

In our previous post , we introduced the topic of ASIL certification for HW elements. In this article, we will give you an idea of what is done as part of ASIL Certification. We will then introduce the concept of HW Evaluation , how it is to be done and what are the challenges in doing it.   Note: ISO26262 does not talk about "Certification" and what is the way to "certify" a component.  ASIL Certification means that a component was developed according to ISO26262, it was audited by Independent Safety Auditors and the Auditor confirmed that the Component meets the qualitative and quantitative expectations for that ASIL level. The Idea behind “ASIL Certification” Basics first. How is Safety is achieved in an Item? By sufficiently preventing Systematic failures - by good design and following ASIL development processes By introducing safety mechanisms to detect random hardware failures and achieving the required quantitative Hardware Metrics for that ASIL level.  Let u