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Showing posts with the label Safety Consultancy

Screw the Audit

  One of the most common mistakes that we have seen developers make when working on a safety program is to think too much about the audit/assessment. We constantly get questioned about whether the things they are doing are sufficient for an audit or whether there would be Non-Compliances (NC) that could arise for doing things in a particular way. Unfortunately, this is a wrong thought process to have. The most important stakeholder for a safe product is the people who will be using the product or the people who could be affected by the safe product (Think pedestrians sharing the same road as the vehicle that is deemed safety relevant). As a developer the thought process should be about doing all the right things relating to safety. A non-exhaustive list of ‘Right Things’ are given below: Understanding what a safe product looks like and what it takes to develop it (Think technology, process, methods & tools) Transparently stating the limits and limitations of your product (Safety

Functional Safety for Domain Controller (DC) ECUs

With the advent of enticing user experience, Electrification and ADAS features in the car, vehicle architecture is strongly headed towards Domain Controllers. In this article, let us discuss the following aspects: What is a Domain controller? Why are OEMs going towards Domain Controllers? What considerations should we have for functional safety in Domain Controllers? In case multiple suppliers are involved in the development of the Domain controller, what challenges exist and how to handle them? What is a Domain controller? Why are OEMs going towards Domain Controllers? Traditional vehicle architectures are de-centralized and distributed with one ECU typically implementing 1 feature/function. Every time a new function/feature is added, a new ECU is added. This kind of an architecture is extremely complex and heavy in terms of wiring (lots of cables, contacts, fusing, relays etc) and makes it very expensive to package all the ECUs into a car. Also, with the increased focus on automated

SW SEooC Verification

If you are an SW SEooC developer, how do you know if you have sufficiently verified your SW? Our 2 -part videos will help you get an answer to this question. If you are new to SEooC, check out our earlier article .

Getting started in ADAS!

If you are someone who has been working in the Automotive domain in various ECUs like power train ECUs, Infotainment, Instrument clusters, Body control etc and you are now getting started in the world of ADAS (Advanced Driver Assistance Systems), this article is for you! ADAS is the way to go for automotive innovation in this decade and THE Safety solution for lesser car accidents on the road. We have compiled here some extremely good articles and videos that can help you get started in ADAS. Read, Watch them. Have fun learning!! SAE Driving levels: https://autonomous-driving.org/2018/03/20/the-6-levels-of-autonomous-driving/ Overview of ADAS:  https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/driver-assistance-technologies#driving-control-assistance-30676 https://dewesoft.com/daq/what-is-adas Complete course on Self-driving cars: https://www.ipb.uni-bonn.de/sdc-2021/ https://www.ipb.uni-bonn.de/sdc-2020/ ADAS Features: ACC: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=own_VaRZ9M8 Reverse Parking Collision Avoid Ass

Configuration Data

 

Flow of Functional Safety Requirements

 

Frequently asked Questions from our Systems Webinar

We have posted some frequently asked questions that were asked during our Systems Webinar in the pdf attached here. Please click the link below to access it. Happy learning! Safety FAQs

Safety Highlights 6-11 of Adaptive Autosar

In our previous blog, we introduced you to the first 5 Safety highlights of Adaptive Autosar. In this blog, let us discuss the remaining 6 highlights. 6. Safe Service oriented Communication HAD use cases demand dynamic upgrade of software applications throughout the entire vehicle lifecycle and to subsequently add new software functions, for instance via over-the-air software updates. Applications may be developed and tested independent of each other in distributed working groups and then integrated into the overall system at any time. Using Service-oriented communication between the software applications makes this possible. Service-Oriented Communication (SoC) is the main communication pattern for AA Applications. The concept of service-oriented communication is based on the idea that there are applications that provide a service on the communication system and other applications subscribe to this service.  The data will only be sent to the subscribers. Here is a picture from Autosar

Safety Highlights 1-5 of Adaptive Autosar

In our previous blog , we introduced you to the 11 Safety highlights of Adaptive Autosar. In this blog, let us discuss the first 5 highlights. 1. Safety considerations for high performance oriented hardware While CA is targeted to run on Microcontrollers that offer hard real time performance, Adaptive AUTOSAR Platform is targeted to run on complex SOCs with hardware accelerators such as accelerators for advanced graphics processing, deep learning accelerators, DSPs, Multi-cores etc in order to achieve high performance. Obviously, this means that there is a lot of concurrent processing going on. To achieve deterministic execution for Safety functions, AA provides design guidelines for using parallel processing technologies .  An ASIL compliant Hypervisor must be used to partition and isolate the Safety critical aspects of the System from the non-Safety related System. 2. Support for Safe and Secure use of C++ While the CA supports only C language, AP support C++ since it is the language

11 Safety highlights in Adaptive AUTOSAR

  Adaptive AUTOSAR (AA) is the buzz word in the context of highly automated driving (HAD). It is the AUTOSAR consortium’s solution for high performance computing and flexible over-the-air updates in HAD and also other ECUs such as Domain Controllers, Infotainment systems etc.  While Classic AUTOSAR (CA) offers an excellent solution to handle traditional ECUs with deeply embedded software and hard real time requirements, it cannot handle HAD and other such intelligent ECUs because its design does not support the high performance and flexibility requirements of these ECUs. This sprung the need to develop a new platform for such ECUs and thus was born AA. An OEM or Tier-1 chooses AA so that they do not have to reinvent the wheel for an architectural solution for the Intelligent ECUs. Due to the safety criticality of these Intelligent ECUs, AA incorporates several safety aspects as part of its architecture. In this blog, we have highlighted 11 of the key differentiating aspects.  However,

Functional Safety Systems Webinar

This is a recording of our Functional Safety Systems Webinar that was conducted on 10-November-2021. Click on the image below to download the webinar slides

Functional Safety Systems - Part 4 - Webinar

This is a recording of our Functional Safety Systems Webinar that was conducted on 10-November-2021.

The inconclusive debate - Class II or Class III

ISO26262’s HW Evaluation talks about 3 Classes of HW Components – Class I, II or III. There are 3 attributes we must use to determine this Class. Once we identify the Class, we need to evaluate them accordingly. At a first glance, this approach sounds simple and straight forward. However, when we read deeper, we realize that the ISO Standard is ambiguous in describing how to determine HW Classes. While it does give 3 attributes, it does not mention how to correlate them. This makes it difficult to conclude how to classify some of the HW elements, especially the medium and high complexity HW ICs. In this blog, we have shared our 2 cents on HW classification of Class II and Class III elements. HW elements are classified based on 3 attributes: Complexity Ease of Identification of failure modes and  Availability of Safety mechanisms Based on these 3 attributes, Class of a HW element is identified as shown below. Can you see the gap in the above table? It does not define how to correlate th

ECC (Error Correction Codes)

ECC (Error correction code/Error correcting code) is a method of detecting and correcting errors in digital data. It is widely used in detecting and correcting errors in data in memories and also for ensuring transmission integrity.  In this article, we have answered some specific questions that are frequently asked about ECC by Safety beginners: From a functional safety perspective, what is the purpose of ECC? Is ECC a mandatory safety mechanism? Is ECC a mechanism to achieve freedom from interference or independence? What aspects must be considered in a System that uses ECC-capable hardware (memories and communication buses) From a functional safety perspective, what is the purpose of ECC? The broad purpose of ECC is to make Memories and transmission much more stable and reliable. That’s why ECC is not only used in Safety critical systems such as Automotive, aviation, defense etc but also in safety-irrelevant ‘maximum-availability’ systems such as file servers and critical databases

How to achieve FTT by design

For every safety critical system, FTT requirements are specified by the OEM. What we often notice is that SW teams do not know the complete picture of how these timings are fulfilled. They tend to think that if testing proves that the FTT time is met, that is sufficient. Then they start to see that even though the Safety SW or HW of the System has not changed, suddenly FTT time measurements from testing start to change noticeably. In some cases that these measurements exceed the required FTT, and now suddenly the team is left wondering how this happened. " We did not change the Safety SW. Looks like the Non-safety part of the system is causing this change but we do not have control over it " they say. If you look at it from the ISO26262 Part-6 V model perspective, on the left side of the V is the Architecture design and the right side of the V is the Verification and Testing.  The argument of proving that FTT was met via testing is in the right side of the V. However, what we